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AN UNEASY UNION: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION IN WASHINGTON STATE
Peter Dolan
Abstract: Same-sex marriage promises to be one of the defining issues of the twenty-first
century. While supporters of same-sex marriage have welcomed a shift in the public’s
perception and increasing acceptance of same-sex marriage in the last decade, controversy
remains over how to balance the competing rights between marriage equality and religious
freedom. While most same-sex marriage statutes around the country include religious
exemptions for religious officials, it is unclear how, or whether, these protections should
extend to wedding service providers who have a religious objection to same-sex marriage.
Conflicts between same-sex couples seeking wedding services and wedding service providers
who have religious objections to same-sex marriage are inevitable, and despite the relatively
recent legalization of same-sex marriage in Washington, such conflicts have already occurred
and will undoubtedly continue to take place in the future. In order to balance these competing
rights, this Comment argues that the Washington Legislature should adopt a “refuse and
refer” method that allows wedding service providers with a religious objection to same-sex
marriage, in limited circumstances, to decline to provide wedding services to same-sex
couples. Such a solution would safeguard the dignitary interests of same-sex couples while
also protecting wedding service providers with deep-seated religious objections to same-sex
marriage from litigation for refusing to provide wedding services to same-sex couples.

INTRODUCTION
On February 13, 2012, Washington Governor Christine Gregoire
signed Senate Bill 6239 into law, legalizing same-sex marriage in
Washington for the first time. 1 A referendum challenge to the new law
was launched almost immediately, giving Washington’s citizens an
opportunity to decide the same-sex marriage question themselves by
popular vote. 2 Washington’s citizens exercised this right and approved
1. Washington Governor Signs Gay Marriage Law, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2012, 10:20 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/14/us-gaymarriage-washingtonidUSTRE81C15L20120214; see also S.B. 6239, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012), available at
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/6239.pdf (providing a
copy of the bill passed by the Washington legislature to legalize same-sex marriage in Washington
for the first time).
2. Washington Voters Approve Gay Marriage, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 8, 2012, 3:06 PM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2019640072_apusgaymarriage4thldwritethru.html
[hereinafter Washington Voters Approve Gay Marriage]. See also COMPLETE TEXT REFERENDUM
MEASURE 74 (2012), available at https://wei.sos.wa.gov/agency/osos/en/press_and_research/
PreviousElections/2012/General-Election/Documents/R-74_complete_text.pdf (last visited June 29,
2013) (containing the actual language of Referendum 74).
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Referendum 74 on November 6, 2012. 3 Hard-fought by both sides of the
same-sex marriage debate, 4 the passage of Referendum 74 was by no
means certain and was merely one step in the long journey of
incorporating same-sex marriage into the laws and social mores of
Washington’s residents. While proponents of same-sex marriage hailed
the passage of Referendum 74 as a step in the direction of equality of
marriage for all, 5 those opposed to same-sex marriage now stand in the
uncertain position of adapting to the reality of the legalized practice of
same-sex marriage in Washington State.
The issue of same-sex marriage is both politically and socially
polarizing because it is so often closely tied to deeply-held personal
convictions, beliefs, and principles. For many, “[t]he debate over samesex marriage has become for the twenty-first century what the abortion
debate was for the twentieth century: a single, defining issue that divides
the country in a zero-sum political battle.” 6 As the battle lines between
those who supported and opposed same-sex marriage during the
Referendum 74 debate slowly dissolve, important issues still remain
regarding the impact of same-sex marriage in Washington. One such
issue is how far religious exemptions should extend for those who are
morally opposed to same-sex marriage on the basis of their religious
beliefs. Religious exemptions are a tool that can be used by a legislature
to exempt certain groups from compliance with certain parts of a law,
such as an exception for churches or religiously-affiliated hospitals that
might otherwise be required to provide emergency contraceptives. 7
Washington’s Senate Bill 6239 lays out the religious exemption
clause that the Washington Legislature included for same-sex
marriages. 8 Senate Bill 6239 provides:
3. COMPLETE TEXT REFERENDUM MEASURE, supra note 2; Washington Voters Approve Gay
Marriage, supra note 2.
4. Washington Approves Gay Marriage in Referendum 74 Vote (UPDATE), HUFFINGTON POST
(Nov. 7, 2012, 3:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/washington-referendum-74gay-marriage_n_2050539.html.
5. Gay Couples Get Marriage Licenses in Washington State, CBS NEWS (Dec. 6, 2012, 12:29
PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57557560/gay-couples-get-marriage-licenses-inwashington-state/.12/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6239-S.SL.pdf.
6. Jonathan Turley, Unholy Union: Same-Sex Marriage and the Use of Governmental Programs
to Penalize Religious Groups with Unpopular Practices, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 59, 59 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008).
7. See, e.g., Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1184 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (providing
a religious exemption for pharmacists who are morally opposed on religious grounds to stocking
and dispensing emergency contraceptives).
8. S.B. 6239, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/
billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/6239.pdf.
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No regularly licensed or ordained minister or any priest, imam,
rabbi, or similar official of any religious organization is required
to solemnize or recognize any marriage. A regularly licensed or
ordained minister or priest, imam, rabbi, or similar official of
any religious organization shall be immune from any civil claim
or cause of action based on a refusal to solemnize or recognize
any marriage under this section. 9
Despite this provision’s language that will protect religious officials
from being required to officiate same-sex marriages, the Washington
Legislature’s failure to protect anyone besides religious officials from
potential lawsuits may lead to legal issues for wedding service providers
with religious objections to same-sex marriage.
While legal conflicts between same-sex couples and wedding service
providers who object to same-sex marriage on religious grounds are just
now beginning to emerge in Washington, similar conflicts have occurred
in other states in recent years. For example, in 2006 a same-sex couple
successfully sued a photographer in New Mexico who declined to take
pictures of their commitment ceremony. 10 In Elane Photography v.
Willock, 11 the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the
photographer’s refusal to photograph the same-sex couple’s commitment
ceremony violated the New Mexico Human Rights Act, affirming the
trial court’s decision to grant the plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment. 12 Many conservative Americans opposed to same-sex
marriage were concerned about the potential implications of this ruling,
and the court’s decision became a rallying cry for efforts to overturn
same-sex marriage statutes, or at least to strengthen the protections for
those with sincere religious objections to same-sex marriage. 13
In January 2013, a situation similar to that in Elane Photography
arose when the owners of the Sweet Cakes Bakery in Gresham, Oregon,
declined to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple’s wedding
ceremony. 14 The couple that owns the bakery contended that they acted
9. Id.
10. See generally Elane Photography v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) (holding
that Elane Photography’s refusal to photograph a lesbian commitment ceremony violated New
Mexico’s Human Rights Act and that the defendant photographer’s constitutional and statutory
rights to freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion were not violated).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 445.
13. New Mexico’s Gay Marriage Lawsuit May End Couple’s Decade in Limbo,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Apr. 17, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-18/newmexico-gay-marriage-lawsuit-may-end-couple-s-decade-in-limbo.html.
14. Gresham Bakery Says Oregon Constitution Protects Refusal of Same-sex Wedding Cake
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within their rights under the Oregon State Constitution when they
refused to bake a cake for a same-sex wedding. 15 Article I, Section 3 of
the Oregon State Constitution states that, “No law shall in any case
whatever control the free exercise, and enjoyment of religeous [sic]
opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience.” 16 On August 13,
2013, the lesbian couple that unsuccessfully tried to order a wedding
cake from the bakery filed a complaint with the civil rights division of
Oregon’s Bureau of Labor and Industries, which plans to move forward
in investigating whether this constitutes a violation of the Oregon
Equality Act. 17 This is a good example of the type of issue that is
becoming increasingly prevalent in a nation that contains people who
hold genuine and heartfelt beliefs at either end of a politically-charged
spectrum: that same-sex marriage is either natural and acceptable, or
morally dubious.
In light of this, the Washington Legislature should reconsider the
religious exemption provisions in its new same-sex marriage law. These
religious exemption protections should be balanced with the need to
protect same-sex couples from undue discrimination and an effective
status as second-class citizens. Professor Jonathan Turley noted, “I
believe (and hope) that the nation will evolve toward a greater protection
of homosexuals and greater recognition of civil unions. This evolution
will not, however, occur if the government is viewed as unfairly trying
to pre-determine the debate or harass one side.” 18 Both sides of this
debate have a concrete interest in finding a middle ground that both
groups can find acceptable.
This Comment begins by outlining the background of same-sex
marriage laws at the federal level in Part I. Part II discusses the
legalization and subsequent impact of same-sex marriage at the state
level. Part III explains Washington State’s history with the issue of
same-sex marriage and its process of legalizing same-sex marriage.
Washington’s religious freedom protections are analyzed in Part IV to
show procedurally how Washington courts treat a legal challenge on a

Order, OREGON LIVE, http://www.oregonlive.com/gresham/index.ssf/2013/02/gresham_bakery_
says_oregon_con.html (last updated Feb. 13, 2013).
15. Id.
16. OR. CONST. art. I, § 3.
17. Sweet Cakes by Melissa, Oregon Bakery, Under State Investigation for Anti-Gay
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Aug.
16,
2013,
11:13
AM),
Discrimination,
THE
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/16/sweet-cakes-by-melissa-bakery-anti-gaydiscrimination_n_3767646.html; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.403 (2008).
18. See Turley, supra note 6, at 75–76.
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religious freedom issue. To provide an analogy to a similar issue, Part V
demonstrates that the Washington Legislature was able to protect
pharmacists with a religious objection to selling emergency
contraceptives and could use a similar method in the context of same-sex
marriage. This Comment then argues in Part VI that greater religiousexemption protections will benefit both sides of the same-sex marriage
debate and that the Washington Legislature should adopt a balancing test
that allows independent business owners and individuals, in limited
circumstances, to decline to perform wedding services for same-sex
weddings when they deem those ceremonies to be against their religious
beliefs. This Comment concludes by demonstrating why a compromise,
which is by definition not ideal for either side, is nonetheless the best
solution for the problems facing this state in a new age allowing samesex marriage.
I.

THE FEDERAL DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT HAS BEEN
RULED UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT

By July 2013, thirteen states had legalized same-sex marriage. 19 The
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
commented that, in light of the country as a whole, “[o]nly a handful of
states have successfully passed legislation legalizing same-sex marriage,
and only a few more have been required to afford equal marital rights to
gay and lesbian individuals through judicial decisions.” 20 In addition, as
of 2012 “[t]hirty states [had] passed constitutional amendments banning
same-sex marriage,” 21 thus significantly limiting the reach of same-sex
marriage in the United States, at least for the time being. At the federal
level, same-sex marriage law was largely controlled by the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), passed by Congress in 1996, which prevented
the federal government from recognizing same-sex marriages and
purported to allow each state to refuse recognition of same-sex
marriages performed in other states. 22 Perhaps most significantly,
DOMA expressly defined marriage as a union between one man and one

19. See Where State Laws Stand, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/
(last visited July 7, 2013).
20. Golinski v. U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
21. Id.
22. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C (2006)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682–83
(2013).
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woman, 23 thus precluding recognition of same-sex relationships at the
federal level.
On July 8, 2010, Massachusetts Federal District Court Judge Joseph
Tauro held that the denial of federal rights and benefits to lawfully
married Massachusetts same-sex couples was unconstitutional under the
Tenth Amendment. 24 The Tenth Amendment maintains that, “[t]he
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to
the people . . . .” 25 This language has generally been interpreted to allow
states to pass laws in areas that are not expressly delegated to the federal
government. 26 State legislation has traditionally included the area of
marriage, and a study by The Christian Post, in June 2013, indicated that
a majority of Americans support the idea of allowing states to decide on
the issue of same-sex marriage themselves. 27
DOMA has been challenged in federal court on several occasions, and
multiple courts have found it to be unconstitutional. 28 In Windsor v.
United States, 29 the Second Circuit held that sexual orientation was a
quasi-suspect classification deserving of intermediate scrutiny, 30 which
was sufficient to strike down Section 3 of DOMA31 as applied to the
23. Id.
24. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 253 (D. Mass.
2010) (holding that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had standing to challenge DOMA’s
constitutionality, that DOMA exceeded Congress’s power under the Spending Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, and that DOMA violated the Tenth Amendment).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbard, 474 F. Supp. 64, 73 (D.D.C. 1979) (“Power is allocated
among the federal government and the states by specifying those powers the Congress might
exercise and by emphasizing in the tenth amendment that undelegated powers were reserved to the
states or respectively to the people.”).
27. Most Americans Say States Should Decide on Same-Sex Marriage, Poll Finds, CHRISTIAN
POST (June 8, 2013, 1:48 PM), http://www.christianpost.com/news/most-americans-say-statesshould-decide-on-same-sex-marriage-poll-finds-97588/.
28. See, e.g., Golinski v. U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(holding that the appropriate level of scrutiny to use when reviewing statutory classification based
on sexual orientation was heightened scrutiny, that DOMA did not satisfy this heightened scrutiny,
and that DOMA did not satisfy a rational basis test); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (2010) (holding that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had
standing to challenge DOMA’s constitutionality, that DOMA exceeded Congress’ Spending Clause
powers, and that DOMA violated the Tenth Amendment).
29. Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that Section 3 of
DOMA is unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff).
30. Id. at 400.
31. Section 3 of DOMA limited the definition of marriage to “a legal union between one man and
one woman as husband and wife.” See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat.
2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, __U.S.__,
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plaintiff as unconstitutional. 32 The United States Supreme Court agreed
to grant review of the decision in Windsor and held that DOMA’s
definition of marriage was unconstitutional as a deprivation of the
personal liberties guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. 33 The Court
reasoned:
DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of statesanctioned marriages and make them unequal. The principal
purpose is to impose inequality, not for other reasons like
governmental efficiency. Responsibilities, as well as rights,
enhance the dignity and integrity of the person. And DOMA
contrives to deprive some couples married under the laws of
their State, but not other couples, of both rights and
responsibilities. 34
The Court’s decision in Windsor opens the door for same-sex couples to
receive benefits that have been denied to them because of the
prohibitions contained in DOMA, 35 and the Court’s decision will likely
also strengthen calls for legalizing same-sex marriage in additional
states. 36
In addition to Windsor, the Supreme Court recently considered the
constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8, which mandated that only
marriages between a man and a woman were valid in California.37 In
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 38 the United States Supreme Court held that
proponents of Proposition 8 did not have standing to appeal the district
court’s order declaring Proposition 8 unconstitutional. 39 In finding that
the petitioners did not have standing, the Supreme Court effectively
declared Proposition 8 unconstitutional without making its holding

133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682–83 (2013).
32. Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 406.
33. United States v. Windsor, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
34. Id. at 2694.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Poll: Support for Gay Marriage Hits High After Ruling, USA TODAY (July 1, 2013,
10:38 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/07/01/poll-supreme-court-gaymarriage-affirmative-action-voting-rights/2479541/ (stating that support for same-sex marriage in
America has never been higher than after the approval of the two landmark Supreme Court samesex marriage cases in June 2013). A record 55% of Americans supported same-sex marriage at the
time of the study. Id.
37. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that Proposition
8 was unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
38. __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
39. Id. at 2668.
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broad enough to affect other states. 40
II.

EACH STATE HAS THE POWER TO LEGALIZE SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE

While federal benefits for same-sex couples have been recognized as
a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor, 41 each state has
historically had the power to decide on its own whether or not to legalize
same-sex marriage, and Windsor allows each state to maintain that
power. 42 Massachusetts was the first state to recognize legal same-sex
marriages with its landmark 2003 decision in Goodridge v. Department
of Public Health. 43 In reasoning its way to an approval of same-sex
marriage, the court in Goodridge found that “[l]imiting the protections,
benefits, and obligations of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples
violates the basic premises of individual liberty and equality under law
protected by the Massachusetts Constitution.” 44 This decision
acknowledged the religious freedom issues that would likely follow, but
did not directly address those issues, stating:
We are mindful that our decision marks a change in the history
of our marriage law. Many people hold deep-seated religious,
moral, and ethical convictions that marriage should be limited to
the union of one man and one woman, and that homosexual
conduct is immoral. Many hold equally strong religious, moral,
and ethical convictions that same-sex couples are entitled to be
married . . . . Neither view answers the question before us. 45
Other state supreme courts have followed the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts’ lead in holding that laws restricting marriage to
heterosexual couples violate state constitutions. For example, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut ruled in 2008 that laws restricting civil
marriage to heterosexual couples violated same-sex couple’s equal
protection rights under the Connecticut constitution. 46 The Court
40. Id.
41. See United States v. Windsor, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2675 (2013).
42. Id. at 2692 (noting that “DOMA . . . departs from [the] history and tradition of reliance on
state law to define marriage”).
43. See generally Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that,
as a matter of first impression, the limitation of protections, benefits, and obligations of civil
marriage to individuals of opposite sexes lacked rational basis and as such violated state
constitutional equal protection privileges).
44. Id. at 968.
45. Id. at 948.
46. See generally Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
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explained:
Although we traditionally have viewed that right [to marriage]
as limited to a union between a man and a woman, “if we have
learned anything from the significant evolution in the prevailing
societal views and official policies toward members of minority
races and toward women over the past half-century, it is that
even the most familiar and generally accepted of social practices
and traditions often mask unfairness and inequality that
frequently is not recognized or appreciated by those not directly
harmed by those practices or traditions.” 47
An oft-cited case involving religious freedom and same-sex marriage
at the state level is the New Mexico Court of Appeals’ decision in Elane
Photography. 48 In Elane Photography, the court found the defendant’s
photography business liable under New Mexico’s Human Rights Act
after the defendant refused to photograph a commitment ceremony for a
lesbian couple. 49 The court noted:
The [New Mexico Human Rights Act] prohibits “any person in
any public accommodation to make a distinction, directly or
indirectly, in offering or refusing to offer its services . . . to any
person because of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry,
sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, spousal affiliation[,] or
physical or mental handicap.” 50
The court held that “Elane Photography’s refusal to photograph [the
plaintiffs’] commitment ceremony violated the [New Mexico Human
Rights Act]” and furthermore that “[i]n enforcing the [New Mexico
Human Rights Act], the [New Mexico Human Rights Commission] and
the district court did not violate Elane Photography’s constitutional and
statutory rights based upon freedom of speech, freedom of expression,
freedom of religion, and the [New Mexico Religious Freedom
Restoration Act].” 51 The New Mexico Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari to review this case and oral arguments were heard on March
11, 2013. 52
On August 22, 2013, the Supreme Court of New Mexico issued its
decision in the case of Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock 53 and found
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 481–82 (quoting In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 451 (Cal. 2008)).
See generally Elane Photography v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 445.
Id. at 433 (emphasis in original) (citing N.M. Stat. § 28–1–7(F)).
Id. at 445.
Elane Photography v. Willock, 296 P.3d 491 (N.M. 2012) (granting writ of certiorari).
2013-NMSC-040, No. 33, 687 (N.M. Aug. 22, 2013).
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three reasons to affirm the judgment of the New Mexico Court of
Appeals. 54 First, the court found that “a commercial photography
business that offers its services to the public, thereby increasing its
visibility to potential clients, is subject to the antidiscrimination
provisions of the [New Mexico Human Rights Act] and must serve
same-sex couples on the same basis that it serves opposite-sex
couples.” 55 Second, the court held that the New Mexico Human Rights
Act does not violate free speech guarantees “because the [New Mexico
Human Rights Act] does not compel Elane Photography to either speak
a government-mandated message or to publish the speech of another.”56
Third, the court found that the New Mexico Religious Freedom
Restoration Act was inapplicable in this case because the government
was not a party. 57 As of this writing, New Mexico has not legalized
same-sex marriage, but this case aptly demonstrates the possibility of
conflict between same-sex couples and those who have a religious
opposition to same-sex marriage. 58
This issue is further highlighted by the path that same-sex marriage
legalization has taken in Rhode Island. On January 3, 2013, legislation
was introduced in the Rhode Island Legislature to legalize same-sex
marriage. 59 However, the proposal faced opposition from Catholic
groups, and Bishop Thomas Tobin stated that it was “immoral and
unnecessary” to push for same-sex marriage instead of civil unions,
which had been legalized in Rhode Island in 2011. 60 The Rhode Island
House Judiciary Committee approved the legislation on January 22,
2013, and the House passed the bill two days later. 61 However, the fate

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., With New Legal Challenge, Gay Marriage Debate in New Mexico Heats Up, N.Y.
TIMES (June 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/us/with-new-legal-challenge-gaymarriage-debate-in-new-mexico-heats-up.html?_r=0 (explaining that a “vigorous campaign” was
under way in New Mexico to legalize same-sex marriage at the time).
59. See H. 5015, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2013), available at
http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/BillText13/HouseText13/H5015.pdf. See also Same-sex Marriage
Bills Introduced in RI House and Senate, PROVIDENCE J. (Jan. 3, 2013, 4:58 PM),
http://news.providencejournal.com/politics/2013/01/same-sex-marriage-bills-introduced-in-rihouse-and-senate.html (explaining that lawmakers in the Rhode Island House and Senate introduced
bills on January 3, 2013 to legalize same-sex marriage in Rhode Island).
60. Providence Bishop Says Gay Marriage ‘Unnecessary,’ BOSTON.COM (Jan. 7, 2013),
http://www.boston.com/news/local/rhode-island/2013/01/07/providence-bishop-says-gay-marriageunnecessary/JtoXYibZLRh3puJhmCAJkO/story.html.
61. See R.I. House Committee Sends Same-sex Marriage Bill to House Floor, PROVIDENCE J.
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of this legislation in Rhode Island remained uncertain because some
religious groups remained concerned about the lack of religiousexemption provisions. 62 In January 2013, Rhode Island State Senator M.
Teresa Pavia-Weed reported that several Rhode Island senators wanted
more expansive religious exemption protections to help shield religious
leaders, charities, churches, and organizations that do not support samesex marriage from lawsuits. 63 The final same-sex marriage bill in Rhode
Island included a religious exemption for clergy members, which helped
assuage concerns from lawmakers that religious leaders could be sued
for abiding by their religious convictions. 64 On May 2, 2013, Rhode
Island became the tenth state to legalize same-sex marriage. 65
III. WASHINGTON STATE HAS A LONG AND COMPLICATED
PAST WITH SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
The process of legalizing same-sex marriage in any state can be a
difficult and contentious journey, and Washington’s journey towards
legalizing same-sex marriage is no exception. Washington entered into
the same-sex marriage debate long before most states’ courts had begun
to consider same-sex marriage issues with the Washington Court of
Appeals’ 1974 decision in Singer v. Hara. 66 In Singer, two gay activists
requested a marriage license from King County, which denied the
request. 67 The activists then brought suit, alleging that the denial
violated the Equal Rights Amendment of the Washington State
Constitution. 68 The court denied Singer’s claim, framing its decision in
language that left no doubt as to the court’s position:
The institution of marriage as a union of man and woman,
uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children
within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis . . . . This
(Jan. 22, 2013), http://news.providencejournal.com/breaking-news/2013/01/house-committee-sendssame-sex-marriage-bill-to-house-floor.html.
62. Rhode Island Gay Marriage Bill Faces Uncertain Future, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2013,
1:49 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/25/rhode-island-gay-marriage_n_2549762.html.
63. Id.
64. See Substitute H.B. 5015, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2013), available at
http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/PublicLaws/law13/law13004.htm.
65. See id.
66. Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974) (holding that the statutory
prohibition in Washington against same-sex marriage did not violate the Washington State
Constitution).
67. Id. at 248, 522 P.2d at 1188.
68. Id.

12 - Dolan Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/10/2013 5:38 PM

1130

[Vol. 88:1119

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

historic institution manifestly is more deeply founded than the
asserted contemporary concept of marriage and societal interests
for which petitioners contend. 69
The Washington State Supreme Court did not grant review. 70
Questions regarding the right to same-sex marriage in Washington
were not raised again until 2004 when the Washington State Supreme
Court considered two similar cases in Andersen v. King County 71 and
Castle v. State. 72 In both cases, same-sex couples challenged the
constitutionality of Washington’s Defense of Marriage Act and
Washington’s laws banning same-sex marriages. 73 The cases were
consolidated for review before the Washington State Supreme Court in
Andersen v. King County 74 in 2006. Finding against the plaintiffs and
reversing the trial court, the Court held:
Applying the current case law that governs our decision and the
narrow issues on which the plaintiffs requested we rule, we hold
that the plaintiffs have not established that the Washington State
Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional under the state
privileges and immunities clause, Article I, Section 12, the state
due process clause, Article I, Section 3, the state constitution’s
privacy provision, Article I, Section 7, or the state’s Equal
Rights Amendment, Article XXXI, Section 1. 75
Although the Court did not find a judicial path to same-sex marriage
legalization in Washington, the Court left open the opportunity that the
legislature might decide otherwise, stating “[o]ur decision accords with
the substantial weight of authority from courts considering similar
constitutional claims. We see no reason . . . why the legislature or the
people acting through the initiative process would be foreclosed from
extending the right to marry to gay and lesbian couples in
Washington.” 76
69. Id. at 264, 522 P.2d at 1197 (quotations omitted).
70. Singer v. Hara, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974) (denying review of Singer, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522
P.2d 1187).
71. Andersen v. Sims, No. 04–2–04964–4, slip op. (Wash. 2004).
72. Castle v. State, No. 04–2–0061404, slip op. (Wash. 2004).
73. See Andersen v. King County, 158 Wash. 2d 1, 8–9, 138 P.3d 963, 968 (2006) (holding that,
under a rational basis standard of review, Washington’s Defense of Marriage Act was rationally
related to the state’s interest, did not violate the state constitution’s equal protection clause, was not
invalid as a violation of privacy interests protected by the state constitution, and did not violate the
Equal Rights Amendment).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 53, 138 P.3d at 990.
76. Id. at 8, 138 P.3d at 968.
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In January 2007, the Washington Defense of Marriage Alliance filed
Initiative 957 in an attempt to increase examination of the same-sex
marriage question in Washington. 77 Initiative 957 proposed that
marriage be limited to heterosexual couples who were able to have
children and that all other marriages should be “unrecognized.” 78
Proponents of I–957 acknowledged that the initiative was “absurd” and
was merely designed to ignite discussion on the same-sex marriage
issue. 79 Initiative 957 was withdrawn by its sponsor before a final vote
could occur. 80
In January 2012, the legalization of same-sex marriage in Washington
moved forward when the Senate Government Operations, Tribal
Relations, and Elections Committee approved Senate Bill 6239 to
legalize same-sex marriage. 81 The Washington State Senate approved
Senate Bill 6239 on February 1, 2012.82 The legislation then passed to
the House, which approved the bill on February 8, 2012. 83 Governor
Christine Gregoire signed the same-sex marriage bill into law on
February 13, 2012. 84
While the law was slated to take effect ninety days after the end of the
legislative session, opponents of same-sex marriage successfully blocked
the law’s implementation by collecting enough signatures to place the

77. I–957 Would Require Married Couples to Have Kids, KOMO NEWS (Feb. 6, 2013, 6:19 PM),
http://www.komonews.com/news/local/5566451.html; see also Initiative 957, WASHINGTON
SECRETARY OF ST., http://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/i957.pdf (last visited July 3,
2013).
78. See KOMO NEWS, supra note 77.
79. Id.
80. Proposed Initiatives to the People - 2007, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF ST.,
http://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/people.aspx?y=2007 (last visited Aug. 26, 2013).
81. See S.B. 6239, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012), available at
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/6239.pdf. See also
Same-sex marriage bill passes in Senate committee, CAPITOL REC. (Jan. 26, 2012),
http://capitolrecord.tvw.org/2012/01/same-sex-marriage-bill-passes-in-senatecommittee/#.UScJvzCR8r8 (explaining that the Senate Government, Operations, Tribal Relations &
Elections committee approved a bill to legalize same-sex marriage in Washington in January 2012).
82. Washington Gay Marriage: State Senate Approves Bill To Allow Same-sex Couples To Wed,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 1, 2012, 11:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/01/
washington-gay-marriage_n_1248801.html.
83. Washington State Legislature Votes to Approve Same-sex Marriage, CNN NEWS (Feb. 9,
2012, 12:56 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/08/us/washington-same-sex-marriage/index.html.
84. See Engrossed Substitute S.B. 6239, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012), available at
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6239S.SL.pdf; see also REUTERS, supra note 1 (stating that Washington’s Governor Christine Gregoire
signed Washington’s same-sex marriage bill into law on February 13, 2012).
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measure on the ballot in November 2012 as Referendum 74. 85
Referendum 74 was ultimately approved, with 53.7% voting for and
46.3% voting against the measure. 86 On December 6, 2012, Washington
issued its first same-sex marriage licenses. 87
Almost immediately, conflict began to surface in Washington
between same-sex couples seeking wedding services and wedding
service providers with strong religious objections to same-sex
marriage. 88 In one of the first such high-profile cases, a Richland florist
declined to provide flowers for a same-sex wedding, providing her
religious beliefs about same-sex marriage as the reason. 89 Citing
Washington’s antidiscrimination law,90 both the American Civil
Liberties Union and the Washington State Attorney General’s Office
filed suit against Arlene’s Flowers and its proprietor. 91 The proprietor
countersued against the Washington Attorney General’s office, arguing
that the Attorney General was attempting to force her to act in a manner
contrary to her religious convictions in violation of her constitutional
rights. 92 Opponents of same-sex marriage have used this case as a
rallying cry and an example of the threat that looms over religious
objectors to same-sex marriage. 93 If no further steps are taken, this case
is in all likelihood the first of many that will attempt to litigate these
same issues.

85. Anti-gay Marriage Measure Qualifies for Wash. State Ballot, USA TODAY (June 12, 2012,
8:56 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2012/06/anti-gay-marriagemeasure-qualifies-for-wash-state-ballot/1#.UScM-TCR8r9.
86. 2012 Washington State Election Results, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 27, 2012),
http://seattletimes.com/flatpages/politics/2012-washington-election-results.html.
87. Washington Starts Issuing Same-sex Marriage Licenses, CNN NEWS (Dec. 6, 2012, 2:32
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/05/us/washington-same-sex-marriage.
88. State’s Case Against Florist Fires Up Gay-marriage Critics, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 18, 2013,
10:36 AM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2020803087_weddingflowersxml.html.
89. Id.
90. WASH. REV. CODE. § 49.60.215 (2010).
91. Washington State and the ACLU Sue Florist for Refusing to Sell Flowers for Gay Wedding
Because of Christian Beliefs, NYDAILYNEWS.COM (Apr. 18, 2013, 8:58 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/flower-shop-sued-shunning-gay-wedding-article1.1321259.
92. Richland Florist Sues State for Violating Her Religious Freedom, TRI-CITY HERALD (May
16, 2013), http://www.tri-cityherald.com/2013/05/16/2397325/richland-florist-sues-state-for.html.
93. See SEATTLE TIMES, supra note 88.
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IV. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IS RECOGNIZED FEDERALLY AND
IN WASHINGTON AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
DESERVING STRONG PROTECTIONS
Litigation concerning wedding service providers’ obligation to serve
same-sex couples has already begun and will likely continue as more
same-sex couples are married. 94 For those with strong feelings on the
issue of same-sex marriage, the stakes are similar to the political and
social debates over abortion rights that began decades ago and continue
still today. 95 However, this issue need not devolve into an ideological
struggle that pits those in favor of same-sex marriage against those
opposed to it in a destructive war of words and costly litigation. It is of
paramount importance that the state government find a way to make
both sides in this debate feel that they are being heard, that their needs
are being addressed, and that they can be confident in the exercise of
their beliefs in an open and reasonable manner without fear of reprisal,
discrimination, or litigation.
A.

The United States Has a Strong History of Protecting Religious
Freedom

Religious freedom in the United States is protected both by state
constitutions and statutes and the First Amendment to the Constitution,
which provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” 96
However, freedom of religion in the United States is not absolute, and it
has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean that while laws
generally cannot interfere with an individual’s religious belief and
opinions, they may interfere with religious practices that may endanger
others. 97 For example, religions may not engage in practices such as
human sacrifice or religiously-sanctioned murder, even if it is mandated
by their religious “beliefs.” 98
When governments pass laws and ordinances that affect religious
activity, they must do so in a manner that is of general applicability and
94. See discussion, supra Part III (referencing examples of pending litigation between same-sex
couples and wedding service providers with religious objections to same-sex marriage).
95. See Turley, supra note 6, at 59.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
97. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (posing extreme hypothetical
situations to make the point that government must sometimes intervene to override certain
dangerous religious practices).
98. Id.
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which advances a substantial government interest in order to justify the
impact on religious activity. 99 In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah, 100 the Court analyzed whether the City of Hialeah had
improperly targeted a religion that engaged in the practice of animal
sacrifices by passing an ordinance that forbade the killing of animals in a
public or private ritual or ceremony. 101 The Court stated that,
“[l]egislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed
to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices.” 102 Furthermore, “[t]he
First Amendment right to free speech necessarily protects any speech, no
matter how trivial. The First Amendment right to free exercise
necessarily protects (within the limits of current Supreme Court
doctrine) any religious belief, no matter how trivial.” 103
While decisions in cases like Lukumi Babalu make it clear that
religious beliefs are much more easily protected than religious practices,
it is not always clear how the court should weigh religious practices
when they burden the rights of other groups in society. 104 Nevertheless,
religious freedom is a fundamental and longstanding right in the United
States, and one that courts and legislatures should consider very
carefully when weighing the legalization of same-sex marriage. 105
B.

Washington’s Constitution Contains Even Stronger Religious
Freedom Protections than the Federal Constitution

The religious freedom protections in the Washington State
Constitution are generally seen as even stronger than those found in the
Federal Bill of Rights. 106 Washington also has a long history of
99. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 523–25.
102. Id. at 547.
103. Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 123, 140 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008).
104. See Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 547 (noting that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause commits
government itself to religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state
intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to
remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures.”).
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 224, 840
P.2d 174 (1992) (noting that “Our state [constitutional] provision ‘absolutely’ protects freedom of
worship and bars conduct that merely disturbs another on the basis of religion.”); see also Stormans
Inc. v. Selecky, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (holding that forcing pharmacists to
deliver emergency Plan B contraceptives despite their sincerely-held religious beliefs violated the
free exercise clause of the First Amendment and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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extending strong protections to the free exercise of religion.107
Furthermore, while the Federal Constitution protects only the exercise of
religion, the Washington State Supreme Court has held that the State
Constitution can protect both freedom of belief and conduct. 108
Washington’s State Constitution guarantees that:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious
sentiment, belief, and worship, shall be granted to every
individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person
or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of
licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace
and safety of the state. 109
Therefore, the Washington Constitution guarantees “[a]bsolute freedom
of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment” subject only to the
qualification that this not be construed to excuse licentious conduct or
justify practices that would be contrary to public policy. 110
In addition to freedom of conscience protections, Washington’s courts
have interpreted the extent of Article 1, Section 11’s religious freedom
protections on multiple occasions. 111 Generally, there are three
prerequisites that must be met for a successful free exercise challenge.112
The first prerequisite to any free exercise challenge under the
Washington State Constitution is whether the parties have “a sincere
religious belief.” 113 To meet this requirement, an individual need only
prove that his or her religious conviction is “sincere and central to their
beliefs.” 114 Once sincerity is “proven,” the court will not inquire further
into the “truth” or “reasonableness” of the individual’s convictions. 115

107. First Covenant Church of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d at 225–26, 840 P.2d at 187.
108. ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION 37 (2nd.
ed. 2013).
109. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., First Covenant Church of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d at 224–25, 840 P.2d at 186–87.
112. Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark Cnty., 140 Wash. 2d 143, 152, 995 P.2d 33, 38–39
(2000) (holding that requiring a church to apply for a conditional use permit or cease its business
activities did not place an impermissible burden on the free exercise of religion).
113. Id. (quoting Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 199, 930 P.2d 318 (1997) (holding that the
city’s demolition permit ordinance, which had the potential to delay a Catholic bishop’s plans to
demolish school building to construct a pastoral center, violated the church’s right of free exercise
of religion as guaranteed by the Washington State Constitution)).
114. Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 199, 930 P.2d at 321 (quoting Backlund v. Board of Comm’rs, 106
Wash. 2d 632, 639, 724 P.2d 981 (1986)).
115. Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 199, 930 P.2d at 321.
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The second threshold for a religious freedom analysis is whether the
challenged enactment or action is a “burden” on the free exercise of
religion. 116 Generally, if the coercive effect of an enactment is to operate
against a party in the practice of his or her religion, then it unduly
burdens the free exercise of religion. 117 The Washington State Supreme
Court has reasoned that “[a] facially neutral, even-handedly enforced
statute that does not directly burden free exercise may, nonetheless,
violate Article 1, Section 11, if it indirectly burdens the exercise of
religion.” 118 Thus, even an indirect burden on the freedom of religion
may be prohibited by Article 1, Section 11 of the Washington
Constitution.
The third threshold question for a religious freedom challenge in
Washington is whether the burden on religion is offset by a compelling
state interest. 119 State action that might burden the exercise of a sincere
religious belief is constitutional under Article 1, Section 11 only if the
action has not resulted in the infringement of a citizen’s right to religious
freedom, or if the burden on that citizen’s exercise of religion is justified
by a “compelling state interest.” 120 A “compelling state interest” is
defined as one that has a “clear justification . . . in the necessities of
national or community life.” 121 Examples of compelling interests are
those based “in the necessities of national or community life such as
clear threats to public health, peace, and welfare.” 122 Furthermore, to
avoid a violation of religious freedom, the state must also demonstrate
that the chosen means to achieve the compelling interests are necessary
and that it is using the least restrictive means available to achieve its
stated goal. 123
C.

Washington State’s Law Against Discrimination Conflicts with
Religious Freedom Protections for Religious Objectors

While Washington has strong protections for religious freedom,
Washington also has several laws that prohibit public discrimination.

116. Id. at 200, 930 P.2d at 321–22.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church of Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 7–8, 639 P.2d
1358, 1362–63 (1982)).
119. Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 200–01, 930 P.2d at 321–22.
120. Id. at 199, 930 P.2d at 321.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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Washington’s primary anti-discrimination law is section 49.60.215 of
the Revised Code of Washington, which states:
It shall be an unfair practice for any person or the person’s agent
or employee to commit an act which directly or indirectly results
in any distinction, restriction, or discrimination . . . [on the basis]
of race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, sex,
honorably discharged veteran or military status, status as a
mother breastfeeding her child, the presence of any sensory,
mental, or physical disability . . . . 124
While homosexual individuals are not presently recognized as a true
“protected class” 125 under Washington law, section 49.60.215 does
protect individuals in Washington from discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. 126 Thus, same-sex marriage objectors’ right to
exercise their religious beliefs can sometimes conflict with same-sex
couples’ right to live their lives free from undue discrimination. 127
Some wedding service providers who oppose same-sex marriage
argue that they should be able to exercise their religious beliefs in good
faith by refusing to provide services to same-sex couples. 128 Those in
opposition to same-sex marriage for religious reasons are sometimes
portrayed as bigots, and some have even gone so far as to draw
comparisons with groups like the Ku Klux Klan. 129 Yet some groups
who are resistant to same-sex marriage on religious grounds feel that
they must stand up for their beliefs, even if doing so offends others. 130
124. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.215 (2010).
125. See Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 400−01 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (discussing that
classifications that disadvantage a quasi-suspect class, such as those who are homosexual, are
subjected to a heightened standard of constitutional review and should be reviewed with
intermediate scrutiny). A protected class is analogous to a “suspect class,” which the court, in
Windsor, defined as a class having “a history of discrimination, an immutable characteristic upon
which the classification is drawn, political powerlessness, and a lack of any relationship between the
characteristic in question and the class’s ability to perform in or contribute to society.” Id. at 401.
Despite this federal precedent, there is no comparable case law in Washington finding that
homosexual persons are part of a “protected class.” See Andersen v. King Cnty., 158 Wash. 2d 1,
67, 138 P.3d 963, 998 (2006) (the Supreme Court of Washington noted in a footnote that federal
case law has reached different conclusions on the question of whether homosexuals constitute a
protected class, but the Court failed to mention any such determination in Washington State).
126. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.215 (2010).
127. See Turley, supra note 6, at 60.
128. See OREGON LIVE, supra note 14.
129. See, e.g., Opponents of Gay Marriage Say They’re No Bigots, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (Mar.
25, 2013), http://www.religionnews.com/2013/03/25/opponents-of-gay-marriage-say-theyre-nobigots/ (explaining that opponents of gay marriage have been portrayed by others as “bigots” and
“likened to the racists and the sexists of yesteryear”).
130. Id.
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All in all, it is likely that those who support same-sex marriage have
downplayed the potential impact of same-sex marriage laws on others’
religious practices, and those who seek a religious exemption for
providing same-sex marriage services downplay the impact that such
exemptions would have on same-sex couples. 131
D.

Wedding Service Providers’ Refusal to Serve Same-Sex Couples
Fulfills All Requirements of a Free Exercise of Religion Claim

The effect of Washington’s same-sex marriage law is, in some
circumstances, to burden the free exercise of religion in violation of
established legal doctrine in Washington. As discussed, the first element
to a free exercise challenge is whether a sincerely held religious belief is
at stake. With regard to same-sex marriage, there is little doubt that
many people have deeply-held religious beliefs that prevent them from
embracing same-sex marriage. The fact that many proponents of samesex marriage characterize those in opposition as bigots is perhaps not
surprising, as there can be “a tendency on the gay-rights side to dismiss
these feelings of moral responsibility on the religious side.” 132 As
Professor Douglas Laycock explained, “There is nothing unique, or even
unusual, about traditional believers feeling personal moral responsibility
if they facilitate, or help celebrate, what they consider to be a deeply
immoral relationship.” 133
The first prong of the religious freedom test readily being met, the
second threshold question is whether there is a burden on the free
exercise of religion. While the burden on the actual exercise of religion
for those who have a religious opposition to same-sex marriage may not
be evident at first, to the people holding such beliefs, the burden is real.
It is not an appropriate role of the government to second-guess an
individual’s stated beliefs and determine that the conduct in question is
not a substantial burden on that person’s beliefs. 134 Professor Chai R.
Feldblum gives the example of an elderly Christian woman who
sincerely believes that if she permits unmarried couples to rent and have
extramarital sex in her rental units, she will be judged by God and will
be unable to meet her deceased husband in the afterlife. 135 Thus, an act

131. See Feldblum, supra note 103, at 125.
132. Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
EMERGING CONFLICTS 189, 195 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008).
133. Id. at 196.
134. See Feldblum, supra note 103, at 144.
135. Id. at 143. Professor Feldblum’s essay points out that a person in the elderly landlady’s
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by the government compelling landlords to rent units to unmarried
couples may constitute a burden on the practice of her beliefs and
religion, even if the majority of people do not hold her same beliefs.
Because of this, Professor Feldblum concludes that “we should err on
the side of accepting the person’s allegation for purposes of deciding
whether a burden on [belief] liberty exists.” 136
The Washington State Supreme Court in First Covenant Church 137
also recognized that legitimate burdens on religious freedom should not
be considered trivial, noting that “[t]he possible loss of significant
[historical] architectural elements is a price we must accept to guarantee
the paramount right of religious freedom.” 138 The Court also stated that
“[o]ur state [constitutional] provision ‘absolutely’ protects freedom of
worship and bars conduct that merely ‘disturbs’ another on the basis of
religion. Any action that is not licentious or inconsistent with the ‘peace
and safety’ of the state is ‘guaranteed’ protection.” 139 Furthermore, the
Court has stated that only dangers which are “clear and present, grave
and immediate” justify an infringement on a person’s religious
freedom. 140 The Court also noted that religious freedom is “vital,” and
that it is the “most important dut[y] of our courts to ever
guard . . . religious liberty, and to see to it that these guarantees are not
narrowed or restricted because of some supposed emergent situation.”141
For wedding service providers with religious objections to same-sex
marriage, being forced to provide wedding services despite their
sincerely held moral qualms constitutes a burden on their religious
freedom of the kind forbidden in First Covenant Church, 142 Holcomb v.
Armstrong, 143 and Bolling v. Superior Court. 144
situation could also choose to take up a different occupation and thus, in a sense, creates this sort of
conflict of her own volition. While this argument may have some merit, it fails to address the
ultimate problem because it merely skirts around it. Even with such a solution, one is still left with a
significant burden on religious liberty for the person who must choose a different line of work to
avoid the conflict, because he or she must choose between their economic livelihood and their
sincere religious beliefs. Professor Feldblum and this Comment argue that, as much as possible, we
should strive not to put anyone in such a position. Id. at 144.
136. Id.
137. First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d. 203, 840 P.2d 174 (1992).
138. Id. at 223, 840 P.2d at 185 (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 224, 840 P.2d at 186.
140. Id. at 225, 840 P.2d at 186–87 (quoting Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 864, 239
P.2d 545 (1952)).
141. First Covenant Church of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d at 225, 840 P.2d at 186–87 (citing Bolling
v. Superior Court, 16 Wash. 2d 373, 381, 385, 133 P.2d 803, 807 (1943)).
142. First Covenant Church of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d at 224–25, 840 P.2d at 185–87.
143. Holcomb, 39 Wash. 2d at 864, 239 P.2d 548.
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The burden on religious objectors to same-sex marriage is evident in a
more practical sense as well. Wedding service providers who refuse to
provide those services to same-sex couples based on their religious
beliefs do so with the knowledge that they will lose the business of that
couple, likely other same-sex couples in the future, and perhaps even
other people who support same-sex marriage rights. 145 Indeed, it is not
difficult to imagine that such businesses risk being boycotted by
members of the general public who strongly disagree with their
beliefs. 146
The first two prongs of the Washington religious freedom test being
met, the third consideration is whether the burden of the law in question
is offset by a compelling government interest. In determining whether a
government’s interest is in fact compelling, “it is useful to look first at
the importance of the value underlying the regulation, and second, at the
degree of proximity and necessity that the chosen regulation bears to the
underlying value.” 147 In this case, the government does have an
important interest in protecting same-sex couples from discrimination on
the basis of their sexual orientation. 148 However, the government also
has a compelling and long-established interest in providing strong
protections for religious freedom and freedom of conscience. 149
Religious freedom is the very first right that is guaranteed by the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 150 and it likewise occupies a
prominent place in Article I, Section 11 of the Washington State
Constitution. 151 Furthermore, allowing private lawsuits against wedding
service providers who have a religious objection to serving same-sex
couples may not best serve the state’s interests. Perhaps the best
resolution to this problem lies in a legislative accommodation that
144. Bolling, 16 Wash. 2d at 381, 133 P.2d at 807.
145. See, e.g., Slew of online hate reviews plagues ‘Sweet Cakes’ bakery, KATU.COM (Apr. 26,
2013, 1:16 PM), http://www.katu.com/news/local/Slew-of-online-hate-reviews-plague-SweetCakes-190072751.html (noting that the Sweet Cakes Bakery in Gresham, Oregon that refused to
bake a cake for a lesbian wedding simultaneously received a plethora of negative Yelp reviews
online but also an increase in business from local supporters).
146. See id.
147. Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269, 1274 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Donald A. Giannella,
Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development Part I. the Religious Liberty
Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1390 (1967)).
148. See discussion, supra Part IV.C (detailing the anti-discrimination protections afforded by
Washington law).
149. See discussion, supra Part IV.B (explaining the general importance of religious freedom in
the Washington State Constitution and common law).
150. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
151. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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carefully crafts a balance between the rights of same-sex couples and
wedding service providers. 152 Such a solution would also serve the
interests of judicial efficiency by forestalling the litigation that is
currently pending in the courts and preventing litigation on the same
issue in the future. 153
While the issue at hand has all of the elements of a freedom of
religion claim, the right to freedom of conscience is also at stake. Article
I, Section 11 of the Washington Constitution guarantees the absolute
freedom of conscience, subject to public policy limitations, 154 and
wedding service providers who oppose same-sex marriage believe that
this is a matter of conscience. For example, parties in opposition to
claims of religious freedom have viewed the decision that confronts
people of faith in the contraception context as “minor, even quaint,
burdens on religious practices like regulations on facial hair, dreadlocks,
drug use, land use regulation, taxation, and the like.” 155 It is not a court’s
purpose to evaluate the relative merits of differing religious beliefs, nor
is it a court’s duty to evaluate the centrality of particular beliefs to a
faith. 156 Whether the conscientious objection is towards same-sex
marriage or analogous issues such as abortion, 157 emergency
contraceptives, 158 or being compelled to wield deadly weapons in
defense of the state, 159 the freedom of conscience is a fundamental right
deserving of strong protections.
When two fundamental and important rights collide with one another,
the government must decide how to best protect its citizens. In this
instance, “[s]tates, of course, have two [choices]: take the win-lose
approach, and elevate the interests of one private party over another; or
do nothing. Of these, the worst result would be to do nothing given the
152. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.065 (1995). Here, in the health care context, the
Washington State Legislature established a statutory conscientious objection provision for health
care providers who object to specific services for reasons of conscience or religion. In a similar
way, the legislature could provide statutory protections to wedding service providers who have a
religious opposition to same-sex marriage.
153. See discussion, supra note 91.
154. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; see also discussion of Article I, Section 11 of the Washington
State Constitution, supra Part IV.B (explaining the importance of religious freedom protections
guaranteed by the Washington State Constitution).
155. Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1184 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
156. Id.
157. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (discussing that the right of conscience in the
abortion context has been recognized as constitutionally permissible).
158. Stormans, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.
159. WASH. CONST. art. X, sec. 6 (providing that no person having conscientious scruples against
bearing arms shall be compelled to do militia duty during times of peace).
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looming tide of litigation.” 160 Given that doing nothing is not an
attractive option, states must instead seek to mitigate, as much as
possible, the impact of a “win-lose approach” between same-sex couples
and wedding service providers. 161 With this “looming tide of
litigation” 162 in mind, this Comment argues that Washington should
adopt a “live-and-let-live” 163 approach to this question, adopting a
“refuse and refer” standard that allows wedding service providers to
refuse service to same-sex couples in limited circumstances. 164
V.

A FEDERAL COURT IN WASHINGTON SIDED WITH
PHARMACISTS WHO VOICED RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS TO
SELLING EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTIVES

While conflicts between Washington wedding service providers and
same-sex couples have not yet received definitive judicial rulings, a
federal court in Washington has addressed an analogous issue in the
context of pharmacists’ rights and religious objections. 165 This is
significant because it illustrates that the freedom of religion is a
fundamental right deserving of protection, and furthermore that a
balance of rights can in fact be struck between conflicting parties.
In Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 166 the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington considered the issue of whether the
State could compel licensed pharmacists and pharmacies to dispense
lawfully prescribed emergency contraceptives over the pharmacists’
sincere religious belief that “doing so terminates human life.” 167
Objecting pharmacists felt that they were being forced to choose
between either violating these regulations or violating their religious
belief that life begins at conception and that emergency contraceptives
are thus immoral. 168
The plaintiffs in Stormans filed suit against the State, arguing that the
law requiring pharmacies to stock and dispense emergency
160. Robin F. Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the
Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 77,
102 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 101.
164. See id.
165. See generally Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1175.
168. Id. at 1175–76.

12 - Dolan Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

10/10/2013 5:38 PM

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

1143

contraceptives violated their religious freedom in a manner prohibited by
the Supreme Court’s decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah. 169 In Lukumi Babalu, the Supreme Court held that
non-neutral city ordinances that were not of general applicability
adversely targeted religious activity. 170 In the same way, the Stormans
plaintiffs argued that the State’s regulations were unfairly trying to force
pharmacists to perform services that they had a religious objection to
providing, effectively forcing them to choose between their religious
beliefs and their economic livelihood. 171
The State argued that the requirements for pharmacists were valid
because they applied neutrally to medicines and pharmacies and
promoted a governmental interest in the timely delivery of medicine,
which was similar to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of religious
freedom in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith. 172 In Smith, 173 the Supreme Court held that the free
exercise clause did not prohibit the application of Oregon’s drug laws to
the ceremonial use of peyote, thus allowing the State to deny claimants’
unemployment compensation for work-related misconduct based on the
use of the drug. 174 In deciding these issues in the context of emergency
contraceptives, the court had to decide whether the facts in Stormans
bore more resemblance to those in Lukumi Babalu or Smith. 175
After weighing these arguments, the court sided with the plaintiffs. 176
The court held that requiring pharmacists, despite their sincerely-held
religious beliefs, to deliver all lawfully prescribed medications,
including emergency contraceptives, violated the plaintiffs’ fundamental
right to the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 177 The court
169. Id. at 1187.
170. See generally Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993) (holding that city ordinances banning animal sacrifices in public were not neutral or of
general applicability and that the state’s interests did not justify the targeting of religious activity).
171. Stormans, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.
172. Id. at 1187 (noting that Smith illustrates a law that burdens religious conduct but is
nonetheless constitutionally permissible because it is neutral and of general applicability, an
argument which the State tried to apply in Stormans).
173. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
174. See generally id. (holding that the free exercise clause of the First Amendment did not
prohibit the application of Oregon’s drug laws to the ceremonial use of peyote, and therefore
Oregon could deny claimants’ unemployment compensation for work-related misconduct based on
the use of peyote).
175. Stormans, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1187.
176. Id. at 1201.
177. Id. at 1200.
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explained, “[p]ermitting pharmacies to refuse and refer for religious
reasons does not create any greater difficulties in terms of patient access
than permitting pharmacies to refuse and refer for secular reasons.” 178
The court found that the regulations were designed to force religious
objectors to dispense emergency contraceptives, and that they sought to
do so despite the fact that refusals for secular reasons were permitted. 179
In a similar manner, a balance could be struck that protects same-sex
couples and also recognizes the religious objections of wedding service
providers. To address these issues, the legislature could craft a religious
exemption provision, similar to that for pharmacists, that allows
wedding service providers who have a religious objection to same-sex
marriage to refuse to provide services to same-sex couples and instead
refer the customer to another provider in the community. Such a
religious exemption would contain important exceptions to help protect
the dignitary interests of same-sex couples in addition to the free
exercise rights of objecting providers. In crafting such an exception, the
legislature could avoid future litigation in favor of a more preemptive
solution to these issues.
VI. THE “REFUSE AND REFER” BALANCING TEST IS THE
BEST SOLUTION TO BALANCE COMPETING RIGHTS
Crafting a test to balance fundamentally competing rights is
inherently an extremely difficult venture, and “[l]egislatures will likely
have to tease out on a case-by-case basis how the state will want to
approach various refusals.” 180 That being said, “[w]ith some predictable
disputes, such as those over reception halls and bakeries, it is difficult to
imagine dire consequences flowing from the refusal of a particular
facility or bakery.” 181 This is not to downplay the inconvenience or
embarrassment that same-sex couples may experience; rather it is simply
an attempt to balance inherently competing interests. Ultimately:
[T]he right to one’s own moral integrity should generally trump
the inconvenience of having to get the same service from
another provider nearby. Requiring a merchant to perform
services that violate his deeply held moral commitments is far
more serious, different in kind and not just in degree, from mere

178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 1189.
Id. at 1201.
See Wilson, supra note 160, at 100.
Id.
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inconvenience. 182
The wedding services industry employs many different types of
providers, including printers, tailors, dressmakers, photographers,
florists, caterers, bridal shops, and wedding registries, any of which
could reasonably seek to refuse to provide these services for same-sex
couples on religious grounds. 183
There is likely no perfect solution to this issue. Favoring either samesex couples or religious objectors creates serious issues for one side or
the other. This being the case, “[p]erhaps the best we can hope for is to
create statutorily a live-and-let-live solution, one that provides the ability
to refuse based on religious or moral objections, but limits that refusal to
instances where a significant hardship to the requesting parties will not
occur.” 184 While this solution means that protecting either wedding
service providers or same-sex couples could necessarily come at the
expense of one or the other in rare situations where there are real barriers
to the access of wedding services and there is no alterative available to
the same sex couple, it is nonetheless the best solution that will, in the
vast majority of circumstances, allow both parties to live out their deeply
held beliefs about marriage. 185
Although solutions that balance rights inevitably leave at least one
side of a conflict unsatisfied, such is the nature of compromise. The
health care controversy over the availability of emergency
contraceptives in Washington is an excellent example 186 of how
Washington courts have found a way to resolve clashes between those
who want a service and those who have a moral objection to providing
it. 187 Because there is no perfect solution to such problems, perhaps the
best solution is one that crafts a religious exemption for those with moral
objections to performing the services in question and yet still protects
those seeking the services.
This Comment recommends that the “live-and-let-live” solution, also
known as the “refuse and refer” method, should have five important
limitations to help protect the rights of same-sex couples seeking
182. Laycock, supra note 132, at 198.
183. Id. at 194.
184. See Wilson, supra note 160, at 101.
185. Id. at 94.
186. See, e.g., Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (holding that
forcing pharmacists to deliver emergency Plan B contraceptives despite their sincerely-held
religious beliefs violated the free exercise clause of the First Amendment and the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
187. See health care discussion, supra Part V.
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wedding services. First, only wedding service providers who personally
provide wedding services to same-sex couples should be able to claim a
religious exemption. One can easily imagine a slippery slope where a
religious objection could be claimed by not only the wedding cake
baker, but also the farmer harvesting the wheat, the mill processing the
wheat into flour, and the deliveryman delivering the flour to the
bakery. 188 Under the proposed test, the baker with a religious objection
to same-sex marriage may be able to claim a religious exemption to
providing wedding services, but the other workers in the chain of cakebaking commerce most likely would not.
Second, there should be limitations on the size of the company that
could claim a religious objection. Generally, those seeking to claim a
religious objection would be limited to small service providers, as
“[t]ruly commercial enterprises owned by individuals with religious
objections to serving same-sex couples will not succeed in challenging
the applicability of public accommodation laws.” 189 Furthermore, larger
businesses are more likely to be able to find someone who is willing to
provide services to same-sex couples, even if some of the workers within
the business are not. Thus far, most of the issues between wedding
service providers and same-sex couples have occurred when the
providers are small business owners who personally have a religiouslygrounded objection to same-sex marriage. This is the type of business
that those who support religious freedom in the context of same-sex
marriage feel is unfairly targeted by the current same-sex marriage law
in Washington. Providing a limited religious exemption to small
businesses with ten or fewer employees would undoubtedly help address
the concerns of such critics and, in so doing, help usher in a more
general acceptance for same-sex marriages.
The third requirement of the “refuse and refer” method would
mandate that a wedding service provider seeking to avoid providing
wedding services to same-sex couples based on his or her religious
objections must openly advertise that fact. This would help alleviate the
“surprise” problem that has so far been at the root of many of the issues
between same-sex couples and objecting wedding service providers. For
example, in the case of the Richland, Washington florist that refused to
provide flower services for a same-sex wedding, the spurned couple was
quoted as saying that the rejection “really hurt” 190 because the florist in
188. See Wilson, supra note 160, at 92.
189. Marc D. Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 1, 37 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008).
190. Barronelle Stutzman, Washington Florist Who Rejected Gay Couple, Faces Lawsuit from
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question “does amazing work” and the couple in question had been
looking forward to using her flowers in their wedding because they had
used her store many times in the past. 191 For many same-sex couples, the
surprise, embarrassment, and insult of going into a bakery, florist’s shop,
or photographer’s studio and being turned away because of their sexual
orientation is more frustrating and painful than the actual effort required
to find a replacement service provider.
The advertising requirement is further strengthened by the simple
truth that it will make a wedding service provider’s opposition to samesex marriage known publicly. It is not difficult to imagine that any
business advertising that it will not serve same-sex couples will face a
loss of business from both same-sex couples and others who support
same-sex marriage. This adverse economic impact will help ensure that
only those wedding service providers who hold sincere religious
objections to same-sex marriage will claim the exemption, as they must
be willing to bear the cost of refusing to provide services for same-sex
weddings. Therefore, any wedding service provider that has a religious
objection to performing services for same-sex marriages must advertise
that objection in a tasteful and respectful manner, using their standard
method of advertising. These advertisements could be located in
storefront windows, in printed advertisement materials, or on a website.
A potential issue with the third prong of this test is the risk that
allowing wedding service providers to choose what types of customers
they will and will not serve will give rise to the same sorts of
discrimination, both racial and otherwise, that have been endemic in the
United States throughout its history. While such concerns are valid,
religious exemptions to the same-sex marriage issue can be
distinguished in several ways. Professor Robin F. Wilson argues:
While the parallels between racial discrimination and
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation should not be
dismissed, it is not clear that the two are equivalent in this
context. The religious and moral convictions that motivate
objectors to refuse to facilitate same-sex marriage simply cannot
be marshaled to justify racial discrimination. 192
Additionally, whereas the Constitution ascribes no value to
discrimination on the basis of race, discrimination on the basis of
State
Attorney
General,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(June
25,
2013,
2:14
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/10/barronelle-stutzman-washington-florist-lawsuit_n_3052301.html.
191. Id.
192. See Wilson, supra note 160, at 101.

PM),
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religion oftentimes stems from the constitutionally protected right to the
free exercise of religion. 193 The Supreme Court has explained that the
Constitution “places no value on discrimination as it does on the values
inherent in the Free Exercise Clause.” 194 The Court has also noted that
“[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of
exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but
it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections” 195 in
the way that religious freedom has. This is not to say that religious
freedom should outweigh the right to be free from discrimination, but
merely that the Constitution explicitly recognizes an affirmative right to
religious freedom, whereas the freedom to discriminate is not a right
afforded the same value by the Constitution.
While some critics may argue that allowing wedding providers to
refuse to serve same-sex couples based on religious objections is
essentially akin to conduct that has been found unconstitutional in
decisions like Bob Jones v. United States, 196 the conduct of wedding
service providers can be distinguished. In Bob Jones, the Supreme Court
found that nonprofit private schools that enforced racially discriminatory
admission standards on the basis of religious doctrine could not receive
tax exemption under the Internal Revenue Code. 197 However, the
extension from racial discrimination to discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation should not be assumed, as, “the Court’s description in
Bob Jones of the ‘consistent’ efforts to eliminate racial discrimination—
even by military force—has no counterpart with same-sex marriage.
[Additionally], the Court found [the discrimination in] Bob Jones to lack
all public benefit insofar as it was in violation of ‘fundamental’ public
policy.” 198 In the context of same-sex marriage, there is a definite public
benefit in balancing the rights of same-sex couples and the right to
religious freedom for wedding service providers, as both rights are
considered fundamental and deserve heightened protection. 199 Indeed, it
is difficult to imagine a more profound public benefit than the protection

193. Douglas W. Kmiec, Same-Sex Marriage and the Coming Antidiscrimination Campaigns
Against Religion, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 103,
115 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008).
194. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973) (commenting on discrimination in the racial
context and noting that the Constitution does not explicitly protect against such discrimination).
195. Id. at 470.
196. See generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
197. Id.
198. See Kmiec, supra note 193, at 110.
199. See discussion of religious freedom in Washington, supra Part IV.B.
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of religious freedom, a fundamental right protected by both the federal
and state constitutions, and freedom from discrimination, a right
guaranteed by Washington State law. 200
The Court in Bob Jones also found a common law public policy
against racial discrimination in education, a public policy that has no
counterpart in the context of same-sex marriage. 201 The Supreme Court
tackled issues of sexual orientation in its decision in Lawrence v.
Texas. 202 Professor Douglas W. Kmiec noted that “[t]he absence of
common law support for same-sex marriage can be discerned in
Lawrence v. Texas. Lawrence may have overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,
but that overruling could not revise the common law, which, even the
Lawrence majority had to concede, did not affirmatively protect
homosexual sodomy.” 203 Instead, the Court in Lawrence simply decided
that they would not be bound by common law or popular notions of
morality. 204 As such, while there is arguably a common law public
policy against racial discrimination in education, there is, at least at
present, no such comparable public policy in the context of same-sex
marriage. 205
The fourth requirement that any wedding service provider seeking a
religious exemption would have to meet is that there be no overt insults
or what could be deemed hate speech made to a same-sex couple seeking
wedding services. The point of providing religious exemption
protections for wedding service providers with religious objections to
same-sex marriage is to protect the free exercise of religion as
guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions, not to give wedding
service providers free reign to wantonly discriminate in a disrespectful
manner against same-sex couples. This situation is not difficult to
200. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.215 (2010) (Washington’s general anti-discrimination
law).
201. Kmiec, supra note 193, at 110.
202. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566–74 (2003) (holding that the Texas statute that made it
a crime for two persons of the same gender to engage in certain intimate conduct violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
203. Kmiec, supra note 193, at 110 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558; citing Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that Georgia’s sodomy statute did not violate the
fundamental rights of homosexuals)).
204. Id.; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558 (holding that the Texas statute that made it a crime
for two persons of the same gender to engage in certain intimate conduct violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
205. This is not to say that there will never be a common law policy against discrimination in
relation to same-sex marriage, but rather that at present no such policy has been developed. Only
time will tell whether courts will create a comparable common law public policy against
discrimination in the same-sex marriage context.
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imagine, as “[t]he larger problem for same-sex couples is the insult, the
pointed reminder that some fellow citizens vehemently disapprove of
what they are doing. But same-sex couples know that anyway, and the
American commitment to freedom of speech ensures that they will be
reminded of it from time to time.” 206 Because protecting the dignity of
same-sex couples is extremely important, any wedding service provider
claiming religious freedom reasons for refusing service must meet all of
the requirements of the proposed test, including the requirement that any
rejection not rise to the level of hate speech. Evaluating the subjective
nature of a person’s language while rejecting a same-sex couple’s
request for services is an inherently difficult activity, but such is the task
that pluralistic societies must sometimes engage in to balance
fundamentally competing interests.
The fifth requirement under the proposed test is that wedding service
providers who decline to provide services to same-sex couples on
religious grounds would be required to refer same-sex couples to other
providers of the same services in their community; namely providers
who do not have the same moral qualms about serving same-sex
couples. In effect, this would require wedding service providers with a
religious objection to same-sex marriage to refer same-sex couples to
their competition, directly causing the objectors to lose potential
customers. In general, this requirement should not be unduly difficult, as
many wedding service providers have no objections to providing
services to same-sex couples, as evidenced by the show of support many
same-sex couples have received after having been refused service on
their first attempt at acquiring such services. 207
However, there will likely be instances where a town’s sole baker,
photographer, or florist has a religious objection to same-sex marriage
which prevents a same-sex couple from having access to such services at
all. In such a case, the legislature could decide either that the same-sex
couple is simply “out of luck,” or determine that the wedding service
provider’s right to moral integrity is outweighed by the same-sex
couples’ right to live in the community in accordance with their moral
beliefs. 208 In the end, this is a policy decision that the legislature must

206. Laycock, supra note 132, at 198.
207. For an example, see supra note 14, detailing how Food Network star chef Duff Goldman
offered a free wedding cake to the couple that was refused service from the Sweet Cakes Bakery in
Gresham, Oregon. This is perhaps not surprising, and shows that any wedding service provider that
chooses to decline to serve same-sex couples must do so with the knowledge that he or she will
undoubtedly lose business as a result.
208. See Laycock, supra note 132, at 199.
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decide on its own. Hopefully, the “live-and-let-live” solution will
minimize the situations where determinations among competing rights
are necessary, but there is little doubt that, on very rare occasions, these
issues will arise even with this balancing test in place. In such a case,
this Comment recommends that the right to live in accordance with a
sincerely-held religious belief should outweigh a same-sex couple’s right
to a particular wedding service. Simply put, the longstanding and
fundamental right to freedom of religion should not be overridden to
force, for example, a baker to bake a cake or a caterer to prepare food for
a same-sex wedding, as living in accordance with one’s deeply-held
religious beliefs should outweigh another’s inconvenience, as frustrating
as that may be for the couple forced to find another comparable service
provider.
CONCLUSION
When fundamental rights come into conflict, disagreements about
how to handle those conflicts are sure to abound. In the context of samesex marriage, both same-sex couples and wedding service providers with
religious objections to same-sex marriage seek to live in accordance with
their deeply held beliefs about love, family, and marriage. In certain
situations, these beliefs come into conflict and thus compromise is
needed. By its very nature, compromise dictates that neither side is
completely satisfied with the outcome, but such is the dilemma that we
as a pluralistic society must sometimes confront.
This Comment has proposed that the Washington Legislature
implement five requirements that would allow wedding service
providers with religious objections to same-sex marriage to refuse to
provide wedding services to same-sex couples under a limited range of
circumstances. First, only wedding service providers who are asked to
perform a personal service for a same-sex couple could claim a religious
exemption. Second, only very small businesses, generally sole
proprietorships and providers with ten or fewer employees, would be
granted a religious exemption. Third, any wedding service provider with
a religious objection to providing services to same-sex couples would be
required to openly advertise that fact. Fourth, the religious exemption
would not excuse subjecting same-sex couples to hate speech and would
seek to reduce, as much as possible, any dignitary effects suffered by a
same-sex couple from such a refusal. Fifth, any wedding service
provider refusing service to a same-sex couple for religious reasons
would have to refer that couple to another similar service provider in the
community. If none can be found, then the legislature would need to
decide which interest outweighs the other in that situation, although this
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Comment argues that in these situations religious freedom should
outweigh the right to wedding services.
Societal change is difficult and can be a painful experience for
everyone involved. However, history shows that while change, such as
the Civil Rights Movement, may be difficult, it is necessary as a
pluralistic society advances and becomes more tolerant of others. In the
case at hand, both sides in the same-sex marriage debate seek to promote
their vision of freedom: religious freedom for some and the freedom to
marry for others. As Professor Jonathan Turley noted:
[T]he progress made toward same-sex marriage and homosexual
rights is due in large part to the protection of free speech and
associational rights. The rights of gay citizens will be secured
not simply with legal but also with cultural changes. The latter
will depend on greater, not lesser, protection of speech and
association on both sides of the same-sex marriage debate. 209
As it stands now, the right to marry for same-sex couples arguably
outweighs the right to religious freedom for religious objectors to samesex marriage in Washington State. The Washington Legislature has an
unprecedented opportunity to legislate a balance of rights between samesex couples and wedding service providers with religious objections to
same-sex marriage that will help stave off future conflicts surrounding
this issue by crafting a compromise in the chambers of the House and
Senate rather than in a courtroom. Regardless of future legislative or
judicial action, the question remains whether marriage equality
proponents, oftentimes self-described as the “champions of
tolerance,” 210 are themselves prepared to practice tolerance towards
proponents of a different moral vision of marriage.
APPENDIX A – SAMPLE LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE
Subject to the limitations defined in this chapter, no individual
wedding service provider may be required or compelled by law
or contract in any circumstances to participate in the provision
of a wedding service for a same-sex wedding if they object to
doing so for reasons of conscience or religion. No person may
face a civil lawsuit because of such a refusal.

209. Turley, supra note 6, at 76.
210. See Stern, supra note 189, at 57.

